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Abstract. This paper differs from any previous view in discussing quantum pure possibilities as individuals, existing independently of any observer or mind. These pure possibilities are also absolutely independent of any metaphysical or logical view that endorses the notion of possible worlds. In my view, the relationship between quantum possibilities and classical physical reality is not between reality as such, as it is in itself, and its phenomena. It is rather between fundamental or primary reality, consisting of quantum pure possibilities, on the one hand, and its actualization in what classical physics has discovered so far, on the other. As individual pure possibilities, quantum entities must be, at least ontologically, distinct and different from one another, regardless of the epistemological standing of quantum physics. Hence, quantum metaphysics is committed to the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Finally, I analyze the two-slit experiment, interference, and entanglement in the light of my approach.

1. Introduction
The idea that quantum reality (or “quantum realm”) has to do with some kind of possibilities is not a new one. Quantum probabilities certainly have to do with possibilities. Some physicists and philosophers of physics speak of such possibilities as potentialities, propensities, tendencies, or dispositions. 
	The first scientist-philosopher who considered quantum reality as consisting of possibilities was Werner Heisenberg. Nevertheless, he did not distinguish between pure possibilities and Aristotelian potentialities (or “tendencies”):

The probability function combines objective and subjective elements. It contains statements about possibilities or better tendencies (‘potentia’ in Aristotelian philosophy), and these statements are completely objective, they do not depend on any observer; and it contains statements about our knowledge of the system, which of course are subjective in so far as they may be different for different observers. In ideal cases the subjective element in the probability function may be practically negligible as compared with the objective one. The physicists then speak of a ‘pure case’. (Heisenberg 1959, p. 53)​[1]​	

The present paper differs from any of the previous views in discussing quantum pure possibilities as individuals, existing independently of any observer or mind and which are real as much as actual entities (actualities) are. These pure possibilities are absolutely independent of actualities, whereas potentialities (or propensities, tendencies, and dispositions) depend on actualities from which they drive their possibility and identity. For instance, the seed is a potential plant, and the seed drives its nature and identity from the actual plant. Hence, existing independently of and prior to the physical-actual, pure possibilities are not potentialities, Aristotelian or otherwise. In my view, however, individual pure possibilities, not potentialities, maintain “fundamental ontic status”. 

2. Individual Pure Possibilities
	What are individual pure possibilities and for what purposes they are necessary?
	Individual pure possibilities are primary or fundamental entities whose existence does not depend upon any spatiotemporal and causal condition or restriction and upon anything actual. These entities determine or fix the identities of all individual actual entities, that is, actualities. The existence of actualities, in contrast, depends upon spatiotemporal and causal conditions or restrictions.
	Primary, fundamental, or basic entities are those that are absolutely irreducible to other entities and without which nothing could exist. Anything that exists is possible, otherwise it could not have existed. Anything that exists is thus an existing possibility, actual or purely possible. Given that my main interest in the modal term “possibility” or “possibilities” is ontological and that I defend a realist approach to individual pure possibilities, I refer to possibilities as substantive modal entities or objects (to be distinguished from modal properties) rather than to modal operators or quantifiers. Given that, what makes an existent possible from the outset is the individual pure possibility of that existent. What makes an existent possible from the outset is what distinguishes it, ontologically and epistemologically, from any other entity, purely possible or actually possible.
	The term “pure” is similar to the one in the term “pure mathematics” to be distinguished from “applied mathematics”. Purely mathematical entities are purely mathematical individual possibilities, whereas the entities of applied mathematics are actual entities—actualities—of these possibilities. 
	 The individual pure possibilities discussed in this paper are mainly mind-independent and hence they are quite different from the “pure possibilities” that some phenomenologists, to begin with Edmond Husserl, have assumed and which are clearly mind-dependent or ideal entities. “Pure”, in my terms, indicates an exemption from any spatiotemporal and causal property, condition, or restriction, whereas “actual” implies yielding to such properties, conditions, or restrictions. Furthermore, “pure” means exemption from, and ontological and epistemological independence of, anything actual. 
	Even though individual pure possibilities are non-actual, this does not mean that they are not actualizable. Furthermore, an individual pure possibility is a non-actual or unactualized possibility also to the extent that something must be left of any individual pure possibility that remains pure and not actualized despite its actualization as an actuality. The reason for this is that any actuality could have changed or been different and yet remains one and the same entity, and, thus, no actuality can exhaust all that pertains to its individual pure possibility. No actuality can completely, entirely actualize its individual pure possibility, which, thus, necessarily remains pure, at least to some extent. Any actuality is simply the spatiotemporally restricted part of its individual pure possibility which is, thus, always more comprehensive or “larger” than its actuality. Hence, the distinction (which is not a separation) between individual pure possibilities and their actualities, whenever such exist in fact, is always maintained.
	Note that no two individual pure possibilities can be identical. So-called or apparent “identical” pure possibilities are one and the same possibility. As absolutely exempt from any spatiotemporal and causal property, two individual pure possibilities that apparently are “identical” cannot exist in the same time at different places or at the same place in different times, and because of this, there would be nothing to make any difference or distinction between them. This would render them indiscernible from each other. As indiscernible, they must be identical as one and the same individual pure possibility. In other words, the time-honored Leibnizian principle of the identity of the indiscernibles must hold true for individual pure possibilities.
	As each actuality has an individual pure possibility of its own, which it does not share with any other entity, this pure possibility fixes or determines the identity of that actuality. Under whatsoever actual circumstances, yielding to spatiotemporal and causal conditions or restrictions, and under any possible change, actualities maintain their identities owing to their individual pure possibilities from which they are inseparable.
	The reason for this inseparability or necessary connectivity is that without the individual pure possibility, or separately from it, any actuality could not be possible, could not exist from the outset. Secondly, any actuality is in fact the spatiotemporally and causally restricted or conditioned part of its individual pure possibility. Each pure possibility thus comprises its actuality as such a conditioned and restricted part of it, provided that such an actuality exists. If the actuality does not exist, the individual pure possibility in consideration exists independently of the fact that there is no actuality of it. In any event, no actuality is separable from its individual pure possibility, from what fixes the identity of the actuality in question.
	Pure possibilities are, first and foremost, substantial individual entities or their parts. Other individual pure possibilities are states and tropes of such entities, whereas properties, being general or universal, pertain to the ways in which individual pure possibilities relate to one another—to their relationality. We should not mistake relationality for relatedness. As we shall see, relationality rests upon the difference between the relating entities (i.e., individual pure possibilities), whereas relatedness rests upon the similarity or likeness of the related entities.
	What are individual pure possibilities not? These possibilities are not abstract entities, haecceities, Platonic Ideas, or possible worlds. 
	They are not abstract entities because, as I understand this term, such entities are abstracted out from actualities, whereas individual pure possibilities are entirely independent of actual reality and thus cannot be abstracted out from it. Abstraction requires criteria, according to which the abstraction is made and which are not abstracted out from actual reality, unless an infinite regress were brought about. Dependence on such criteria, on the one hand, and on actualities, on the other, renders abstract entities as unsuitable to serve as individual pure possibilities, which are fundamental entities. Furthermore, actual entities are concrete existents, whereas individual pure possibilities are specific or particular entities, which, obviously, are not general. In contrast, abstract objects are generalized from actual, concrete entities.
	Individual pure possibilities are not haecceities. As each such possibility comprises all that is possibly open to an entity under one and the same identity, it is not a sort of an essence, let alone an actual essence; thus, an individual pure possibility is not a haecceity.
	Individual pure possibilities are not Platonic Ideas either because these Ideas are universals, in which their tokens “take part” or which individual things “imitate” (and as Aristotle criticized these terms, they must be simply metaphorical), whereas individual pure possibilities are individual entities. Platonic Ideas are not possibilities. Instead, they are “paradigms” and “causes” of any other entities, namely, of their “tokens” or “namesakes”. These “tokes” or “namesakes” are separate from the Ideas (this separation is the famous chōrismos because of which Aristotle harshly criticized Plato and the Platonists), whereas actualities are never separate from their individual pure possibilities.
	Finally, individual pure possibilities are not possible worlds. Even though the possible-worlds conception is quite prevalent and accepted by possibilists as well as actualists,​[2]​ it is questionable, in any of its forms, for various reasons. It is not clear enough, and there are many controversies about it with no universal or long-standing consent. The problem of the epistemic accessibility from one world to another, especially from the actual world in which we live to any possible world, does not appear to have a satisfactory solution. Moreover, if possible worlds are possible ways, maximal or otherwise, of actual reality (the ways in which actual reality could have been), they must depend on it, and thus they cannot be appropriate to pure possibilities, which are entirely independent of actual reality. For this reason, many actualists have accepted the ideas of possible worlds and of possibilia at possible worlds, whereas I suggest a possibilist alternative, completely realist about individual pure possibility and the ways in which they relate to each other, namely, their relationality, and, thus, entirely independent of any possible-worlds conception. As for merely possible worlds, entirely independent of anything actual, they, too, raise more problems than reasonable solutions, especially regarding the epistemic access to them. If, according to other views, possible worlds are propositions about actual facts or states that could have been different, again, they depend on actual facts, which render them inappropriate for my possibilist view. Hence, if we can dispense with the possible-worlds conception and find an adequate, clearer and simpler, alternative to it, we should take this possibility into consideration.
	Indeed, individual pure possibilities are not susceptible to such problems and difficulties. They are clearer in comparison to the concept of possible worlds. To refer to these possibilities is quite simple. Strip any individual actuality of its spatiotemporal and causal properties or conditions, and you are referring to and considering its individual pure possibility without being involved in any real difficulty or obscurity. To do so, all you need is to use your intellect and imagination. You can simply consider the identity of such an actuality in comparison with anything else you can imagine, regardless and independently of anything spatiotemporal or causal.	
	“Stripping” an individual entity of its spatiotemporal and causal conditions, restrictions, or properties is not abstracting, for no generalization is involved in such a “stripping” process, whereas abstracting requires generalization. A “stripping” process, in contrast, clearly uncovers and preserves the individual identity of the entity under consideration. The same holds true for comparing, regardless of anything spatiotemporal or causal, the entity under consideration with any other entity in order to consider its individual identity. Nothing of generalizing is involved in such a process, which is thus free from any abstracting. By no means does the outcome of this process depend upon the actuality that is relevant to the starting of the process, rather the contrary—the actuality under discussion depends on the outcome, which is an individual pure possibility. We start the process with that actuality in order to uncover what makes it possible from the outset, namely, to reveal the possibility on which it depends, ontologically and epistemologically, from the outset.   
	Any actuality is possible but not all possibilities are actual. Hence, there are many more individual pure possibilities than actualities and the whole realm of individual pure possibilities is larger and more comprehensive than its spatiotemporally and causally restricted part, which is actual reality as a whole.
	 To sum up, individual pure possibility is what distinguishes, ontologically and epistemologically, an individual entity from any other entity, possible or actual, regardless of any spatiotemporal and causal conditions and independently of anything actual or empirical.
	For what are individual pure possibilities good? In other words, are individual pure possibilities necessary and for what purpose? Individual pure possibilities are necessary for ontological and epistemological reasons. For ontological reasons, because without individual pure possibilities no actual existent would be possible—if any actuality were not purely possible from the outset, namely, prior to the spatiotemporal and causal conditions of its existence, it could have not existed at all from the outset. For epistemological reasons, because without individual pure possibilities we cannot identify, know, and understand many natural phenomena nor discover something new. When crystallographers observe or synthesize for the first time some unfamiliar even “absurd” crystals (quasicrystals, for instance)—whose constructions are incompatible with all that the crystallographers theoretically or empirically have known—they must have an access to the pure, theoretical possibilities of such strange, totally unfamiliar crystals. Such pure possibilities are purely mathematical. Think, furthermore, about nuclear physicists or chemists who observe or produce for the first time some strange transuranium atoms. These atoms are so heavy that they are expected, empirically and theoretically, to collapse or to be disintegrated within some milliseconds. Nevertheless, they sustain for quite a lot time and demonstrate some new chemical properties indicating a new element. These physicists must have some access to the individual pure possibilities of such atoms. Such possibilities can be discovered only by theoretical-mathematical means and not by any empirical, actual observations or experiments. Scientists would have not discovered the actual Higgs boson some years ago, if Higgs and two other theoretical physicists had not succeeded in their theoretical discovery of the pure possibility of such a boson (for which they gained the Wolf Prize). And there are many other examples. 
	As for our epistemic accessibility to individual pure possibilities, we always can use our free imagination to consider individual pure possibilities that are different from any entity with which we are familiar, of which we have been reported, or which have been described to us. Creative persons are especially able to do so. Original artists do so all the time. And the same holds true for inventors and discoverers. Ordinary people frequently use their imagination for thinking about such possibilities or to consider them while initiating projects, making plans, thinking about new solutions to some problems, considering the unexpected, thinking of something that is considered as improbable yet possible, and so on. Whenever we think or believe that things could be otherwise or different, we are, in fact, thinking about or considering individual pure possibilities and their general relations. However finite and limited our knowledge of individual pure possibilities and their general relations, this knowledge is always open for further expansions and progress.	
	In what follows, I will take a possibilist way, realist about individual pure possibilities, as this way is less traveled despite its surprising merits and novelties, whereas the actualist way, especially since the works of Quine, Goodman, and many others, has been much more traveled and has become, in many of its variations, much more popular and pertaining to the main stream. 
	There is a deeper reason for my preferring the possibilist option to the actualist one mentioned above. We, human beings, are not confined to actual reality as a whole and to actualities. Individual pure possibilities—as the objects of our planning, choosing, creating, predicting, and discovering—are vital for our life. Our imagination and intellect are certainly not confined to actual reality and they do not necessarily need to abstract possibilities out from it. 
	We need individual pure possibilities, real possibilities, to know and understand the world, ourselves, and our relationships with other people. No law can be said to hold without assuming possibilities and excluding others.  Both the determinist and the fatalist believe that things could not be different or otherwise, and to believe so one must first assume possibilities to exclude some of them. All the more so are those who believe that things could be different and even entirely different; they must assume the existence of real possibilities even if such possibilities have never become actual. Every existent, every entity, is possible. There are no impossible entities. All the other modal categories—existence, contingency, and necessity—are all kinds of possibility. 
	Do non-actual, non-physical possibilities exist independently of our mind? There are, certainly, such possibilities, for instance, the entities or objects of pure mathematics are, in fact, mathematical individual pure possibilities. It is quite reasonable to consider purely mathematical entities as mathematical individual pure possibilities. In pure mathematics (to be distinguished from applied mathematics, as application and actualization are considered as synonyms), whatever is proved to be possible is, in fact, proved to be a purely mathematical existent, and if the proof is sound, this existent is also necessary. These purely mathematical entities are thus mathematical individual pure possibilities, whose existence is entirely independent of actual, physical reality and of any spatiotemporal and causal conditions. The existence of these discovered entities is mind-independent.
	Individual pure possibilities are non-actual (even though they are actualizable); they are thus not subject to any spatiotemporal and causal conditions. In contrast, all physical entities, all actual possibilities, are subject to the same spatiotemporal and causal conditions or restrictions. Thus any actual thing, any actuality, is a physical entity, and any physical entity is an actual individual possibility—an actuality—different from any other actuality. Any actuality is an actualization of an individual pure possibility, which is distinguished or discernible from any other individual pure possibility. For this reason, any individual pure possibility serves as the identity of an actuality. 
	As I will show below, quantum possibilities are individual pure possibilities that are actualized as physical entities, first as subatomic particles and, at the end, as parts of macrophysical objects, which are subject to classical physical theory, a theory of classical physical objects, which are not quanta. Individual pure possibilities are entirely independent of actual, classical physical reality, of any mind, and of any notion of possible worlds. Quantum pure possibilities are discoverable by our imagination and intellect, not by empirical means. Only actualities, physical entities, are discoverable by empirical means. Finally, individual quantum pure possibilities are like pure mathematical objects or entities, which are also individual pure possibilities, existing quite independently of actual, physical reality and of any mind. Hence, the entities of pure mathematics are discoverable by means of our intellect and imagination. This can be proved quite briefly: there is a necessity about mathematical pure entities and their relations; they are never contingent, whereas invention is usually subject to contingency and the arbitrary will of the inventor. Hence, mathematical pure objects or entities are discoverable and not inventible. Generally speaking, individual pure possibilities are discoverable, not inventible. They share this quality with mathematical pure possibilities. 
	Physical reality is vitally dependent upon its mathematical individual pure possibilities and their universal relationality. Pure mathematics, as its name indicates, is independent of any applicability to anything actual-physical, whereas anything actual-physical is vitally dependent upon the applications of pure mathematics. Any physical entity, any actuality, is quantitative and must have quantitative and other arithmetical and geometrical properties. These properties are actualizations of the general or universal relationality of mathematical individual pure possibilities.  Without the applications of pure mathematics, quantities and other arithmetical and geometrical properties make no sense. But the reverse is excluded, as pure mathematics is entirely independent of actual properties and of being applied to the actual-physical reality. Even if actual quantities and, hence, the actual-physical reality as a whole did not exist, pure mathematics, as comprising mathematical pure possibilities, would have existed as it is. Pure geometrical or arithmetical entities have all the meaning, sense, and significance they need without relying upon any actual quantities. The reverse, however, is simply impossible. 
	Furthermore, actual-physical entities are also dependent upon physical individual pure possibilities, for these possibilities determine and fix the identities of these actual entities. For instance, any actual particle depends for its identity upon its individual pure possibility, otherwise it would not have been possible from the outset. Physical individual pure possibilities are discovered by means of pure, theoretical physics, which our intellect and imagination consturct. Thus, the pure possibilities of atoms and of subatomic particles (such as the Higgs boson, the omega-minus, and the like) were discovered, and necessarily so, independently and, in many cases, before the discovery of the actual particles. The theoretical discovery is of an individual pure possibility that determines and fixes the identity of the actual particle. Actual physical reality is thus dependent upon the pure possibilities that a purely physical theory discovers. Whenever such a discovery is correct and complete, physical-actual reality is as this theory truly describes it, based upon the purely possible grounds of this reality. There are individual pure possibilities that theoretical physics or chemistry discovered in the past and yet these possibilities (for instance, aether, caloric, and phlogiston) happened to remain unactualized and the theories that discovered them proved to be empirically wrong. The contrary is the case of physical individual pure possibilities that have been actualized and empirically confirmed as actualities. In each of these examples, the relevant individual pure possibilities exist independently of the actual-physical reality and of empirical observations. Nevertheless, only experiments and empirical observations can tell whether we conceive the possibilities that happen to be actualized and whether the relevant physical theory is empirically valid.

3. Quantum Possibilities and Reality
Returning now to quantum mechanics, my view differs considerably also from Abner Shimony’s metaphysics of quantum mechanics (Shimony 1978, following Werner Heisenberg), whose definition of potentiality as “a modality that is somehow intermediate between actuality and mere logical possibility” (Shimony 1999, p. 6) is quite obscure. Somewhat less obscure is the following comment by J. S. Bell, referring to an interference of particles mechanics:

There are places on the screen that no electron can reach, when two holes are open, which electrons do reach when either hole alone is open. Although each electron passes through one hole or the other (or so we tend to think) it is as if the mere possibility of passing through the other hole influences its motion and prevents it from going in certain directions. Here is the first hint of some queerness in the relation between possibility and actuality in quantum phenomena. (Bell 1987, p. 185; the italics are mine)

Contrary to Bell, in my realist view, the pure possibility of passing of the electron through the other hole really determines the actual movement of the electron and prevents it from going in certain directions.
	Now, call the purely possible “non-actualized possible”, and you may find the following quite relevant to our discussion:
… modal interpretations interpret quantum mechanics by slightly changing the standard understanding of the modalities “actuality” and “possibility.” … the terms  … that refer to the non-actualized outcomes are not removed from the state of the device. This procedure of removing the non-actualized possibilities is, however, quite standard in statistical theories. … In modal interpretations the state is now not updated if a certain state of affairs becomes actual. The non-actualized possibilities are not removed from the description of a system and this state therefore codifies not only what is presently actual but also what was presently possible. These non-actualized possibilities can, as consequence, in principle still affect the course of later events. (Vermaas 1999, pp. 26–27) 

Although this modal interpretation of quantum mechanics differs from my approach, it does not contradict it. The “effect,” better, the significance of the purely possible has a prominent position in Vermaas’s description, which thus shares something of importance with my approach to quantum metaphysics. If the actual is phenomenal, observable, and measurable, quantum mechanics, according to Vermaas’s modal interpretation, describes reality including its unobservable or immeasurable states of affairs, which Vermaas calls noumenal (ibid., pp. 209–211), namely, not phenomenal, not perceived by the senses but conceived by the intellect. Nevertheless, in my view, the relationship between quantum possibilities and classical physical reality is not between reality as noumenal, as it is in itself, and its phenomena. It is rather between fundamental or primary reality, consisting of quantum pure possibilities, on the one hand, and its actualization in what classical physics has discovered so far, on the other.
	A declared possibilist approach to quantum theory is that of Ruth E. Kastner. Claiming that “quantum theory is about possibility” (Kastner 2013, p. 2), she further explains: 

. . . there is a well-established body of philosophical literature supporting the view that it is meaningful and useful to talk about possible events, and even to regard them as real. For example, the pioneering work of David Lewis made a strong case for considering possible entities as real.  . . .  In Lewis’ approach, those entities were “possible worlds . . .  My approach here is somewhat less extravagant:  . . . I wish to view as physically real the possible quantum events that might be, or might have been, experienced. So, in this approach, those possible events are real, but not actual; they exist, but not in spacetime. The actual event is the one that is experienced and that can be said to exist as a component of spacetime.  . . . we can think of the observable portion of reality (the actualized, spacetime located portion) as the “tip of an iceberg,” with the unobservable, unactualized, but still real, portion as the submerged part. (Kastner 2013, p. 2)

So far so good, even though I would prefer “possible state” to “possible event” as I consider an event as actual (see below). More problematic is the following: “I thus dissent from the usual identification of ‘physical’ with ‘actual’: an entity can be physical without being actual” (ibid). As the physical and the actual yield the same spatiotemporal and causal conditions or restrictions, they must be identical. Hence, in my view the actual is the physical, although there are physical or quantum individual pure possibilities that, unlike actualities, cannot cause or prevent anything physical-actual. But the major difference between Kastner’s view and mine lies in the following:
Heisenberg ... made the following statement: “Atoms and the elementary particles themselves are not real; they form a world of potentialities or possibilities rather than things of the facts” . . . . This assertion was based on the fact that quantum systems such as atoms are generally described by quantum states with a list of possible outcomes, and yet only one of those can be realized upon measurement. I think that he was on to something here, except that I would adjust his characterization of quantum systems as follows: they are real, but not actual. In his terms, they are something not quite actual; they are “potentialities” or “possibilities”. Thus my proposal is that quantum mechanics instructs us that we need a new metaphysical category: something more real than the merely abstract (or mental), but less concrete than, in Heisenberg's terms, “facts” or observable phenomena. The list of possible outcomes in the theory is just that: a list of possible ways that things could be, where only one actually becomes a “fact”. (op. cit., p. 36)

As I have said above, I do not follow Heisenberg’s notion of potentialities. Individual pure possibilities are not Aristotelian or otherwise potentialities, for these possibilities are entirely independent of actual reality, whereas Aristotelian or otherwise potentialities are clearly dependent upon it (the seed of a plant is the potentiality of the plant, yet, undoubtedly, the existence of the seed depends upon that of the plant that produced this seed). The major problem is with the semi-status of Kastner-Heisenberg’s possibilities: although, unlike concepts or ideas or other mental entities, these possibilities are “real” and not mind-dependent, they are not as real as actualities are. In contrast, in my view, individual pure possibilities are as equally real, though differently, as actualities are.​[3]​ Individual pure possibilities are fully particular or specific. My approach is completely realist about individual pure possibilities, whereas Kastner appears to have a semi-realist view about quantum possibilities, conflating possibilities with potentialities.​[4]​ Kastner’s “possibility as physically real potentiality” (Kastner 2013, pp. 149 ff.), following Heisenberg and Aristotle, is, clearly quite different from my realist approach to individual pure possibilities. The status of Kastner’s approach as a kind of possibilism or realism about possibilities is not clear and decisive enough. 
	Aristotle was not a possibilist. On the contrary, he was an actualist all the way. It is not by chance that the Aristotelian unmoved mover is an actus purus. This pure form that has nothing potential or material in it indicates the supremacy of form over matter, energia over potentia, in Aristotle’s philosophy. It is the form (as energia) that fixes and determines matter (as potentia), not the other way round. If Kastner wishes herself to be a full-blown or a determined possibilist (and yet to keep a distance from what she considers as David Lewis’s extravagance), this view of potentialities that are more real than mental or “abstract entities” but less real than actualities is not the right way to take, let alone a clear and decisive enough one. Moreover, contrary to her view, subatomic particles are clearly actualities.​[5]​ If the Higgs boson, for example, had not been discovered as an actuality in CERN (by means of indirect observation), it would have remained simply a theoretical possibility (or, a Heisenberg-Kastner’s possibility). In CERN, the Higgs boson was discovered as an actuality, whereas before this discovery this subatomic particle was predicted and its pure possibility was discovered by means of a theory. Subatomic particles are actualities, whereas quantum entities are quantum individual pure possibilities. These pure possibilities are the necessary fundamental conditions for the existence and identity of the quantum actualities, which are subatomic particles and their states. As macro-physical entities are compounds of subatomic, atomic, and molecular particles, quantum individual pure possibilities are eventually the fundamental possibilities of all physical entities, microphysical and macro-physical alike. 
	In fact, my view on quantum possibilities is different from all the acknowledged possibilist views known to me, let alone of actualist ones.​[6]​
	On a metaphysical possibilist platform, I will try to illuminate the quantum reality as consisting of individual pure possibilities and their relationality, a reality which the reality, subject to classical physics, actualizes. This platform—panenmentalism [Realism about Individual Pure Possibilities [hereafter RIPP, and the adjective is RIPPist]]—is realist about individual pure possibilities.  Do not let the name “panenmentalism” misleads you, the metaphysics under consideration is both realist and nominalist and by no means idealistic of whatsoever sort. [A good synonym for “panenmentalism” is “panenpossibilism”.] Panenmentalism is a novel possibilist metaphysics that is neither rationalistic, nor empiricist. It is also principally different from Kantianism.​[7]​ In panenmentalist terms, individual quantum pure possibilities and their relationality are not mere thought-constructions; rather they are ontologically robust, at least as actualities are. Panenmentalism is possibilism de re, not de dicto. Individual pure possibilities are possibilia de re (Gilead 2004).
	On the grounds of the above, individual pure possibilities are not ideal-like entities. Nicholas Saunders suggests that “to mathematically single out one state at the act of measurement (or decide the fate of … [Schrödinger’s] cat) is to introduce idealike entities into the theory. These have the role of filling up all of the possibilities that exist in the superimposed wave-function” (Saunders 2000, p. 527). As this approach asserts, “whenever a measurement is made, the universe branches out into as many varied versions as there are possible results to that measurement. At the end of the experiment there exists one universe in which Schrödinger’s cat is alive and one in which it is dead” (ibid.). Undoubtedly, it is an interesting interpretation but I do not accept its tacit metaphysical basis that possible worlds or universes exist.​[8]​ Instead of possible worlds, the metaphysical view—panenmentalism—to which I refer here stipulates an infinitude of individual pure possibilities, each of which relates to all the others. No need exists to assume a possible world in which Schrödinger’s cat is dead and another in which it is alive. The pure possibilities of being dead or of being alive are open to that cat, whether it actually exists in our one, actual world or not. Finally, instead of questionable or obscure “ideal-like entities,” panenmentalism refers to individual pure possibilities and their relationality, for each pure possibility necessarily relates to all the others from which it differs. Such relationality is necessary because no two individual pure possibilities could be identical and they are different from each other and, hence, they necessarily relate to each other. As the principle of the identity of indiscernibles is valid for individual pure possibilities (see more about this below), two allegedly identical individual pure possibilities are indeed one and the same individual possibility. Against the background of the above, panenmentalism can suggest a possibilist interpretation of quantum physics without relying upon the idea of possible worlds at all. 
	John von Neumann’s formulation of quantum mechanics (known as the orthodox quantum theory) also refers to “the multitude of possibilities” (Nicholas Saunders 2000, p. 528). With von Neumann’s interpretation, “at the act of measurement, the wave-function, or mathematical description, of the quantum system collapses into only one of the possible outcomes that formed part of the initial superposition” (ibid.). Thus, the complete mathematical description of Schrödinger’s cat “maintains the dual dead-and-alive nature up until the point of measurement, at which it is collapsed from these two possibilities into only one” (ibid.). An event is “something that distinguishes between the different possibilities inherent in the superimposed wave-function and results in one particular possibility being selected” (ibid.). This is more lenient to panenmentalism.​[9]​ Note that the possibilities under discussion are, first of all, metaphysical or ontological. Namely, their status is not merely epistemic but only in the secondary sense, relying upon their primary, metaphysical sense. Whether we know these possibilities or not, they exist independently of our mind, thus our mind has to discover them as metaphysical or ontological. 
	To the extent that our present knowledge is concerned, it is short of a completely adequate knowledge of quantum reality, possibilities, and probabilities. Hence, we have two principle possibilities to explain this short of knowledge philosophically: the Kantian way and the Spinozistic one. 
	The Kantian possibility is to argue that we do not know anything about reality as it is in itself but only by means of our forms of knowledge. Quanta, wave-functions, non-locality, collapse, measurement, and the like belong to our epistemic concepts and quantum phenomena. Thus, according to this possibility, they have nothing to do with the physical reality as it is in itself. They have only to do with the relationship between us, as knowing persons, and reality. I do not endorse this view. I think that quantum physics is about reality as it is in itself, otherwise what is the point about the whole debate: If we do not know reality as it is in itself but only as a phenomenon, there is no problem at all in assuming that the observer changes the observed reality. According to Kantian view, any observation changes reality; actually, any observation constructs reality as a phenomenon. Notwithstanding, we have a problem with this view, and we would like to have a possible solution to it.
	The Spinozistic view is more plausible at this point. Uncertainty, undecidablity, and measurement are part and parcel of our first kind of knowledge—imaginatio—which is simply partial knowledge of reality as it is in itself (ut in se est). For Spinoza, mistakes or errors have no absolute ontological status. We mistake or err only because we have partial knowledge, which is a part of reality as it is in itself! Because we know only a part of it, which we mistake for a whole, and because we draw a borderline between this part and the rest of reality, we imagine and misconceive reality, namely, conceiving it only in the first kind of knowledge, imaginatio. To emend this, we need to embed that part in the reality as a whole, which is a comprehensive, total system, the whole of nature.
	Ontologically and traditionally speaking (say in Newtonian mechanics), physical reality consists of elementary particles, some “atoms” (in Latin “individua,” namely “those that are indivisible,” or “the indivisibles”), whereas the physical phenomena of this reality consist of sensible data, such as colors, sounds, tangible qualities, smells, and the like. This is the classical-Atomist distinction between physis—reality as it is in itself—and nomos—our convention in perceiving it: According to the physis, only atoms and void do exist, whereas, according to the nomos, there are sensible qualities and the like. According to my view, as it is presented in this paper, the relationship between quantum possibilities and classical physical reality is not between reality as such, as it is in itself, and its phenomena; the relationship is not between physis and nomos, but between fundamental or primary reality, consisting of quantum pure possibilities, on the one hand, and its actualization in what the classical physics has discovered so far, on the other. What my view and the Atomists’ one both share is the assumption that the “foundations” of physical reality consist of elementary entities and their relationships. Yet, the Atomists consider elementary particles as actualities, whereas I consider elementary entities as individual pure possibilities. Subatomic particles are actualities and, as such, they are distinct from the quantum entities, which are their individual pure possibilities. Sub-atomic particles are micro-parts, elementary parts, of the macro-actualities, which are the direct objects of our observations and experiments.
	To return to quantum physics, there is no way to prove of course that this scientific achievement has reached a completion. Probably, we have only a partial picture of reality. As individual pure possibilities, quantum entities must be, at least ontologically, distinct and different one from the other, no matter what the epistemological standing of quantum physics is. Since each pure possibility is different from any other pure possibility, in the light of panenmentalism, quantum metaphysics is committed to the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, even if quantum physics, as a theory under this or that interpretation, does not discern their individuality or, else, cannot apply the principle of that identity to the quantized excitations of the field.​[10]​
	Nevertheless, we should not ignore the following comment: “Schrödinger . . .  wrote of indistinguishable particles as ‘losing their identity’, as ‘nonindividuals’, in the way of units of money in the bank (they are ‘fungible’). That fitted with Planck’s original idea of indistinguishable quanta as elements of energy, rather than material things—so, again, quite unlike classical particles” (Simon Saunders 2013, p. 350). This appears to be the received view, even though Simon Saunders himself mentions an opposing view, considering particles as distinct individuals. As elements of energy, are quanta really indistinguishable, nonindividuals, and fungible? Not at all. As long as quanta are measurable and countable, they are individuals.​[11]​ Only individual entities can be counted and measured. It only appears to be the case that we do not discern any distinction between quanta, when we count or measure them. Notwithstanding this, in fact, whenever we add one quantum to another, whenever we count it, or measure it, we are obviously distinguishing between it and any other quantum. For instance, suppose that it is the 32nd quantum in our count. This makes it different from the 31st quantum or the 30th quantum, or from any other quantum in our counting. Each of these quanta certainly makes a difference, as there is a clear difference between counting 888 quanta, 887 quanta, or fewer. Even one quantum makes a difference. For this matter, it is not important if we count a quantum, as permutable, in another order and if we cannot identify it from other quanta after the counting. Even if we know nothing about its identity over time, in counting it, we distinguish between it and any other quantum in our counting. Any click of the apparatus sounds “exactly identical” to another, yet such is not the case, as each click makes a difference, signifying a difference. Any count requires the homogeneity of the counted individual units but, on the contrary, the homogeneity under discussion does not eliminate the individuality of each counted unit. No quantum is fungible, as long as it, and not another quantum, is counted and measured. It is this quantum that is measured and counted, not another one. The individuality and “thisness” under discussion rest upon the individual pure possibility of the actual quantum, to which we can refer and which is the object, the individual object, of our counting or measuring. Note that Leibniz’s principle converts numerical differences into qualitative ones. If we do not discern any qualitative difference or any difference of properties between two apparently “identical” drops of water, the numerical difference between them, namely, that they are two and not one, is sufficient to discern between them and to conclude that they are not identical. Even though their place is permutable, there is a real difference between them and they are not identical.  The first is not the second and vice versa. The same is the case with subatomic or atomic particles. The principle of the identity of the indiscernibles is thus valid for quanta and any subatomic or atomic particle. Finally, note that Quine, on whose theory of identity Simon Saunders relies, was a declared actualist. My possibilist arguments are not affected by actualist ones.
	Hence, contrary to Saunders’s claim that “Indistinguishability is essential to the interpretation of quantum fields in terms of particles” (op. cit., p. 340), I insist that because the individual pure possibility of each particle cannot be the individual pure possibility of another particle, Leibniz’s principle of the identity of the indiscernibles is valid for actual quanta and particles, as much as it holds true for their individual pure possibilities (namely, pure quanta). Given that in our observation there is a specific number of quantum actual entities, what determines this number if not the sum of their individual pure possibilities?! To count them—their countability—necessarily requires that each of them has a distinct individual possibility of its own!
		Before proceeding further, let me say something about the metaphysical status of wave-function and entanglement. 
	Some quantum mechanical scientists as well as philosophers of physics assume that entanglement and wave-function reflect adequately actual quantum reality. Though these quantum pure possibilities really exist, they do not exist as actualities, namely they do not spatiotemporally exist. My metaphysical interpretation distinguishes between individual pure possibilities, which are quantum metaphysical possibilities, and actualities, which are the objects of classical physics (in the branch of quantum gravity). Thus, as I see them, entanglement and wave-function are not actual quantum states​[12]​ but pertain to quantum individual pure possibilities that may be accepted or rejected on theoretical grounds. On the basis of metaphysical considerations, any actual entity or event—an actuality—is inescapably subject to spatiotemporal and causal conditions, otherwise no actuality can exist (what otherwise would makes it actual, then?). In other words, spatiotemporal and causal conditions are necessary for the existence, recognition, discerning, and identification of any actuality. In contrast, did entanglement and wave-function reflect actual states and entities, could this be compatible with those necessary conditions for any actual existent? By no means, for, on possibilist interpretation, it is impossible to locate spatiotemporally any quantum entity or state and to link it with a causal chain. Only if one assumes, on actualist grounds, that quantum possibilities are, in fact, actualities existing in different worlds or universes, is one allowed to consider quantum states and entities as actualities and, thus, as subject to spatiotemporal and causal conditions or restrictions. In my realist view about individual pure possibilities, quantum entanglement and wave-function are not actualities, neither do they reflect actualities. They are epistemic pure possibilities, which reflect ontological pure possibilities and their relationality.
	According to this view, classical physics actualizes quantum pure possibilities and their mutual relationality. This means that the quantum realm is wider or more comprehensive than the actual realm of classical physics. This holds true for the realm of pure possibilities as a whole: The realm of pure possibilities comprises the whole realm of actualities, while the realm of actualities is a limited and confined part of the realm of pure possibilities. This part exists within the realm of pure possibilities.
	[This special relationship of comprising gives my [omit all this paragraph from the blind version, as it discloses the name panenemtnalism] metaphysics the name “panenmentalism” or “panenpossibilism,” as panenmentalism presumes that the purely possible is the mental, whereas the physical-actual consists of its conditioning and limiting under spatiotemporal and causal conditions or determinations. Note that the mental and the psychical are by no means one and the same. Only the psychical depends on minds and subjects, whereas the mental or the spiritual is absolutely independent of them. By “mental” I mean the conceptual, or something like what Spinoza entitled the Attribute of Thought, with the clear difference that, while in Spinoza’s philosophy Thought and Extension are parallel, and the one is not extensive or “wider” than the other, in panenmentalism, in contrast, the mental is wider and more comprising than the physical-actual, which is included in the former.] 
	To demonstrate that quantum reality consists of pure possibilities and not of actualities, we must first show that, at least under some interpretations, unlike actual quanta or subatomic particles, quantum entities are not spatiotemporally and causally determined or conditioned. Only pure possibilities are not determined or conditioned so, whereas any actuality is spatiotemporally and causally conditioned or determined. We are unable to determine such conditioning insofar as quantum entities are concerned. It is impossible to locate spatiotemporally a quantum entity, or you can never determine how to locate it spatiotemporally. 
		In other words, my answer to the notable question—Where is the border between quantum physical reality and classical physical one?—is that the border lies where we should distinguish between individual pure possibilities, pertaining to the quantum reality, and their actualities, eventually belonging, in contrast, to classical physical reality. This answer clearly differs from the approach concerning the so-called collapse of the wave-function. It rests, instead, upon the metaphysical distinction between quantum individual pure possibilities (including their relationality) and their actualities in the classical physical reality.
	Notwithstanding, there is a strong connection between classical physics and quantum mechanics, otherwise we should divide nature into two separate and independent parts (as if “two Substances”), whereas the whole of our physical theory consists of universal laws, valid for nature as a whole. In its own way, the panenmentalist approach to quantum mechanics implies a unity between classical, non-quantum physics and quantum mechanics. Given that any individual pure possibility and its actuality constitute a unity (as they are inseparable), considering quantum reality as the purely possible substratum for classically physical reality, as the actualization of quantum reality, establishes a unity with it. This conclusion should be regarded as physically fruitful. Nevertheless, there is no received physical theory yet to show what the nature of such unity is, even though there is a novel promising suggestion how an adequate solution to this problem may be achieved.​[13]​ In any case, the present state of physics does not exclude the metaphysical necessary linkage or conditioning of classical physics and quantum physics.
	Panenmentalism has made an attempt to explicit this metaphysical linkage, and like other metaphysical explications, it is universal. I postulate that the quantum reality is fundamentally all there is physically speaking, namely, that the ontological “foundations” or “building blocks” of which physical reality ultimately consists are quantum pure possibilities. These possibilities are individuals, namely the 
elementary entities (indivisible entities) of which physical reality as a whole consists.

4. The Relationship between Quantum Pure Possibilities and Classical Actualities

The relationship or linkage between quantum pure possibilities and classical mechanical actualities is actualization. In other words, all classical physical states are fundamentally actualities of quantum pure possibilities, of micro pure possibilities. In other words), all classical mechanical states are fundamentally quantum possibilities spatiotemporally and causally conditioned or determined. As such, these possibilities are not pure; they are actual instead. In panenmentalist terms, any actuality is subject to spatiotemporal conditions or restrictions. Thus, locality indispensably characterizes any actuality. In contrast, locality necessarily does not characterize pure possibilities, which are indispensably non-local, for pure possibilities are necessarily exempt from any spatiotemporal conditioning. Therefore, in the event that non-locality is indispensible for quantum mechanics, it concerns quantum pure possibilities instead of quantum actualities. 
	As a result, instead of dealing with “collapse” and some other such terms, we may from now on deal with measurement, determination, and observation of actualities, which are observable in the reality of classical physics. No measurement takes place in the micro, quantum reality, as it is in itself; only its actual manifestations are measurable. Though non-locality is inferred from observations of empirical phenomena, what scientists eventually refer to, in such cases, are the quantum pure possibilities and not anything actual, which must be, as any actuality, local (otherwise, what is actual about it?). What we observe are quantum possibilities spatiotemporally and causally determined; nothing purely possible is observable. Anything in the classical physical reality is spatiotemporally and causally determined and conditioned, as classical physics shows. Hence, I suggest that “collapse” should be replaceable by “actualization”. 
	Given that Einstein was perfectly right: God(-Nature) does not play dice, yet this Spinozistic truism holds true not only for classical physics, which is fully subject to complete causal determinism; quantum reality too is deterministic. As my view clearly demonstrates (Gilead 2009), necessity holds for the purely possible reality as a whole. Thus, it certainly holds for the realm of quantum pure possibilities as a whole. It is a priori cognizable, namely, theoretically fixed and discovered, and each quantum pure possibility necessarily relates to all the rest. This is precisely, for instance, the famous involvement of every electron with the state of every other electron in the universe as an “ontological commitment of quantum mechanics” (French and Redhead 1988, p. 245)! This involvement has nothing to do with causal and spatiotemporal conditions or determinations. 
	Hence, in the classical physical reality there is no influence “from a distance” as the influence is subject to the constant c, whereas in quantum reality the involvement of each entity with all the rest is no other than the universal relationality of any pure possibility to all the rest. Nonlocality “in” the spacetime is a result of the nonlocal nature of quantum wave-functions (especially when there is entanglement), and this nature consists of the relationality of individual quantum pure possibilities.
	Nonlocality does not appear to be compatible with causality and with actualities as such. It has to do, instead, with the relationality of individual pure possibilities, which, by definition, are not subject to any spatiotemporal and causal conditions or restrictions. As relying upon relationality, nonlocality reveals the ways in which pure quantum possibilities relate to one another. In empirical reality, in contrast, actualities are interconnected by means of causal relations. Nevertheless, this does not preclude nonlocality, whenever quantum individual pure possibilities are concerned. These possibilities relate to one another regardless of any locality, causality, or spatiotemporally. From a panenmentalist viewpoint, each thing is connected with all the others, as each individual pure possibility necessarily relates to all the others. Hence, in empirical, actual reality—the reality of classical physics which actualizes the reality of quantum mechanics—nonlocality reflects only the relationality of all the relevant quantum individual pure possibilities. 
	The non-causal involvement of each electron with the state of any other electron in the universe is beautifully compatible with the panenmentalist universal relationality of each pure possibility, which, owing to its difference, necessarily relates to all the others. Panenmentalist quantum metaphysics is thus committed to the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Furthermore, according to this metaphysics, quantum possibilities, like any other pure possibilities, must be discernible individuals. This necessity is strictly metaphysical, whereas the physical reality as actual is contingent. In other words, physical-actual reality as a whole could not exist at all, whereas no pure possibility could not exist. Hence, the existence of each pure possibility is necessary, whereas that of anything actual is contingent. 
	Ontologically speaking, the realm of quantum pure possibilities precedes or is prior to the realm of physical actualities as a whole. In contrast, historically speaking, the discovery of quantum physics occurred well after the discovery of classical physics. Nevertheless, this does not make any difference for the priority of the quantum reality, which is ontologically, metaphysically prior to the physical-actual reality, which is well described by classical physics. If these conclusions are right, as a result, quantum mechanics does not actually describe actual physical reality but, instead, it rather describes the purely possible reality that makes actual physical reality possible. Quantum pure possibilities are the ontological grounds for the actual physical reality.
	Are there “quantum events”? Is a quantum “event” an actuality? If it is spatiotemporally and causally determined and if it is measurable or observable (indirectly, by means of the observed consequences or indications), the quantum event is an actuality; if not, it remains purely possible. In such a case, it should not be considered an event at all but merely a determination of a pure possibility. If it is an actual event, it is an actualization or an actuality of a pure possibility. What determines which of the open possibilities under one and the same pure possibility-identity actually takes place must be an actualization. The act of measurement thus gives rise to the quantum event, which means that the actualization of either of the possibilities that are open for the cat—being alive or being dead—is eventually determined. Instead of being under either mathematical description, the event is an actualization of either pure possibility comprised in one and the same pure possibility-identity of that cat. Any actual living cat could be a dead one, as the actual existence of the cat is contingent only. The two pure possibilities, that of life and that of death, are open to any cat. The quantum case is different from the classical one, as the quantum case is actualized as a classical case, never as a quantum case. Thus, the quantum case always remains only purely possible. All the observations, directly or indirectly, that physicists make are of the classical, macro phenomena which are, eventually, the actualities of quantum states, i.e. of quantum pure possibilities. 
	Whenever physicists indirectly observe, measure, and weigh subatomic particles, they are analyzing the particles, isolating, and locating them only because they take part, however tiny in size, in the macro-physical reality, the only reality in which such observations and measurements can occur. We are not subatomic particles, interacting with other subatomic particles; we are macro-physical (and mental) entities, existing in macro-physical reality, in which we perform all of our observations and experiments and which is subject to classical, non-quantum physics. It is only because of the interaction with this reality that quantum observations can be performed and analyzed. Classical physics subjects all macro-phenomena, in which quantum possibilities take fundamental parts, to general relativity. Otherwise, subatomic particles would have no mass and no gravity and they could not have been measured.
	An event deserving its name is an actuality, and, with panenmentalism, anything actual is contingent, as necessity belongs only to the realm of the purely possible, a priori cognizable. As Saunders writes, “orthodox quantum mechanics consists of two fundamentally different processes: Deterministic evolution under the Schrödinger equation and indeterministic collapse at the point of measurement” to which alone can the concept of an “event” be applicable (Saunders 2000, p. 529). In panenmentalist terms, a quantum event too, if really an event and not a mere determination of a pure possibility, is contingent or indeterminist. For only its determination as a pure possibility is subject to deterministic necessity. Note that according to panenmentalism, necessity pertains only to pure possibilities and their relations (think of pure mathematics consisting of mathematical individual pure possibilities and their relationality). In contrast, the actual is inescapably contingent—anything actual could not have existed rather than existed; anything actual depends on endless actual circumstances. In contrast, as exempt from any spatiotemporality, individual pure possibilities are unchangeable—they could have not been different.  Panenmentalism does deals with “determinism of pure possibilities” instead of determinism of actualities, which is, according to panenmentalism, impossible (there are various kinds of determinism, only one of which is causal). The same holds for quantum reality. As consisting of quantum individual pure possibilities and their necessary relations, it is deterministic contrary to actual reality that is inescapably contingent. 


5. The Two-Slit Experiment, Interference, and Entanglement in the Light of Panenmentalism

Each individual pure possibility contains all the possibilities that are open to it as maintaining its identity. For instance, this paper could have been created or produced under quite different circumstances—all of which are possibilities that are open to it—and still keeps its identity. The scope of the pure possibilities that are open to such a particular entity is, in any event, more comprehensive, “larger” than its actuality, which contains only the actual possibilities that this paper actualized, actualizes, or will actualize. All the rest of its possibilities are non-actual and remain simply pure. 
	The very same holds true for a quantum individual possibility. All the quantum mechanical possibilities that are open to it as an entity are included in its wave-function. Under proper circumstances, namely in the two-slit experiment, some of the possibilities that are open to a quantum entity are actualized, and this entity behaves as a wave and not as a discrete particle. But when the circumstances are different, and fewer opportunities of actualization are in fact open to this entity, for instance, when it is measured or when in the experiment there is only one slit, the entity is actualized (“behaves”) as a discrete particle. The reason for this is that measurement is, in fact, a quantization, which means that the entity is forced to be actualized as a discrete particle and not as a wave. The measurement quantizes the actualized entity as a discrete particle and exhibits it as if it were isolated from the rest of the possibilities that are open to it. When other possibilities are open to the same entity, for instance, in the opportunity to enter two slits and not one, a part of the wave of possibilities that are open to it is actualized. In such a case, interference occurs, as some of the possibilities that are open to the same entity exclude some others. Binary possible states, though excluding one another, are open to the same quantum individual pure possibility under different actual circumstances. Another kind of excluding possibilities that are open to the same quantum entity is that of incompatible observables.
	Incompatible observables pertain to the quantum realm but not to the realm yielding to classical physics. These observables indicate excluding measurements; whenever the measurement of a quantum position is determined, the measurement of the quantum momentum is undetermined and vice versa. Moreover, change in the order of the measurements implies a change in the measured values of the same observable. Considering a measurement as an actualization of the relevant value, it must depend on the actual circumstances under which the measurement is taken. Thus, the different and excluding possibilities of the incompatible observables that are open to a quantum entity as an individual pure possibility can be actualized, in the same actuality, under different circumstances. In any case, only one of such observables can be determined, namely, actualized under the circumstances of a particular measurement.
	Entanglement rests upon two different panenmentalist principles—relationality and relatedness. Relationality maintains the difference between the entangled entities and subjects each of them to the principle of the identity of the indiscernibles, whereas relatedness maintains the similarity and the complementariness of the entangled entities. This difference and this similarity have to do with these entities as quantum individual pure possibilities and, hence, they do not rely upon any spatiotemporal and causal conditions or restriction. The information treasured in the entangled entities and which opens for them the possibilities to behave complementarily, despite any possible difference between them, does not depend upon the speed of light or on any means of communication. It depends only on the relationship between the entangled entities as quantum individual pure possibilities that are related. No spooky action at a distance is involved, for the related (entangled) pure possibilities are not restricted to any spatiotemporal and causal conditions, whereas distance rests upon spatiotemporality and action rests upon causality. These entangled individual pure possibilities are related in such a way that any change in the actuality of one of them must entail a complementary change in the actuality of the other without any involvement of action or causal connection between them. The change in the actuality is due to measurement, which actualizes one of the possibilities that are open to the measured particle. When measured, the other entangled (related) particle actualizes the complementary possibility open to it under the actual circumstances. The determination of the one determines also that of the other, not because of any influence or causation, but only because of the entangled-related possibilities of the two entities. The determination of the one fixes that of the other. All the rest is a matter of the actualization of the relevant possibilities. Note that the results of the measurement are unpredictable, for, like any actuality, they are contingent. What is necessary is the existence of the relevant pure possibilities and the (non-causal and non-local) connection (relationality and relatedness) between them, whereas the measurement is contingent. Hence, until the measurement occurs, the relevant determination of the actuality does not occur; once the measurement occurs, the other entity can actualize only the complementary possibility that is open to it under the actual circumstances. The connection involved is only between the relevant quantum individual pure possibilities.   
	In this way, panenmentalist realism about quantum individual pure possibilities and the understanding of the relationality and relatedness of these possibilities explain away quantum “absurdities” at the metaphysical level. 

6. Conclusions
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^1	 	 Cf.: “The probability function does—unlike the common procedure in Newtonian mechanics—not describe a certain event but, at least during the process of observation, a whole ensemble of possible events. The observation itself … selects of all possible events the actual one that has taken place. … Therefore, the transition from the ‘possible’ to the ‘actual’ takes place during the act of observation. … the word ‘happens’ can apply only to the … physical, not the psychical act of observation, and we may say that the transition from the ‘possible’ to the ‘actual’ takes place as soon as the interaction of the object with the measuring device, and thereby with the rest of the world, has come into play; it is not connected with the act of registration of the result by the mind of the observer” (op. cit., p. 54). Citing a part of this paragraph, Dorato 2011 replaces “possible” by “dispositional” (or “possibilities” by “dispositions” or “propensities”).  Cf. Suárez 2007, pp. 423. According to the modal interpretation of Lombardi et al. 2011, propensities belong to the realm of possibility and they produce definite effects on actual reality even if they never become actual. In their view, probabilities measure ontological propensities, which embody a possibilist non-actualist possibility. Cf. Lombardi and Castagnino 2008, pp. 391 ff. 
^2	 	 Yet some recent actualists have dispensed with it, for instance, Jacobs 2010, Vetter 2011, and Fine 2012. Consider also Lowe 2006. Christopher Menzel defines actualism and possibilism as follows: “Actualists  . . . deny that there are any non-actual individuals. Actualism is the philosophical position that everything there is—everything that can in any sense be said to be—exists, or is actual. Put another way, actualism denies that there is any kind of being beyond actual existence; to be is to exist, and to exist is to be actual. Actualism therefore stands in stark contrast to possibilism, which . . . takes the things there are to include possible but non-actual objects” (Menzel 2014). Contrary to actualism, my possibilist approach distinguishes between two kinds of existents—that of individual pure possibilities and that of actualities. In my view, individual pure possibilities exist independently of actualities. Even though many actualists adopt the idea of possible worlds, all of them explicitly reject the existence of merely, purely possible individuals or particulars, which are entirely independent of the actual. 
^3	 	 At this point, I agree with Lombardi and Castagnino 2008 and Lombardi et al. 2011 that quantum possibilia are as real as quantum actualities are. Nevertheless, individual pure possibilities are quite different from those quantum possibilia in various fundamental respects, especially in the complete independence of individual pure possibilities of actualities, propensities, and properties and in their substantiality and universal metaphysical significance as well. In my view, actualities, being time-variant, are also quite different from Lombardi’s actualities, being time-invariant or even “timeless” (Lombardi and Castagnino 2008, p. 431).
^4	 	 Indeed, relying upon Heisenberg view on the status of “potentia” as “something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality”, Kastner considers her proposal concerning “possibilist realism” (or possibilist transactional interpretation) as “merely chooses to take seriously Heisenberg’s concept of potentia and follow it where it leads” (Kastner 2010, p. 91). Cf.: “something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event” (Kastner 2013, p. 36). In contrast, individual pure possibility is a real, mind-independent possibility, which is equally real as actuality is, even though, unlike actuality, individual pure possibility is exempt from any spatiotemporal and causal conditions or restrictions. Note that, unfortunately, John Cramer himself, the father of the transactional interpretation, does not follow Kastner’s possibilist approach to his interpretation. Cramer states: “We note that Ruth Kastner’s ‘Possibilist Transactional Interpretation’   . . . treats quantum wave functions as being real objects only in an abstract multidimensional Hilbert space, from which transactions emerge in real space. The possibilist approach is not incorrect, but we consider it to be unnecessarily abstract” (Cramer 2015). In contrast, I believe that Kastner is in the right (possibilist) direction, which Cramer, alas, considers as simply “unnecessarily abstract”. Yet, unfortunately, her approach is not clear and decisive enough. As I see it, metaphysically speaking, one has to clearly decide between fully-fledged possibilism and actualism.	For elaborating on the idea that an empirical complex reality is an actualization of a virtual-potential quantum state, see Schäfer 2006a, 2006b, 2008, and Schäfer et al. 2009. This approach, too, follows, to some extent, Heisenberg and Aristotle. 
^5	 	 Kastner’s ontology of subatomic particles may gain support from some physicists and philosophers of physics. For instance, Casey Blood states: “in spite of all expectations, particles are not necessary to explain any observation. That is, there is no evidence that photons, electrons, protons and so on exist as particles, separate from the wave function—with ‘particle’ being defined here as a carrier of mass, energy, momentum, spin and charge localized at or near a single point” (Blood 2011, p.1). Zeh is even more radical over this matter (see, for instance, Zeh 2010, p. 1481). Décio Krause and Otávio Bueno comment on Blood’s view in a more moderate way: “We believe that, as far as current quantum physics (QFT) goes, he [Blood] is right. But, of course, his criticisms are directed against the standard concept of particle, described by classical physics. However, Redhead’s point still stands: some concept of particle remains (whether such particles are thought of as ‘epiphenomena of fields’, ‘field excitations’, or whatever)” (Krause and Bueno 2010, p. 271). Thus, Krause and Bueno “acknowledge that contemporary physicists deal with a particle concept (although not with the classical one). This is the concept we are concerned with. We will speak of protons, neutrinos, electrons, and quarks as they appear in physical theories (albeit as a secondary species of objects), and we will consider which properties they have, which logic they obey” (op. cit., p. 273). The unavoidable conclusion from Zeh’s interpretation of quantum mechanics and from his idea of its universal validation or expansion all over the updated physics makes classical or non-quantum physics simply redundant, as if a relics of what he considers as a scientific religion. I cannot believe that such a conclusion can be really defended. Classical physics and quantum physics are both necessary for our knowledge and understanding of physical reality. Moreover, all macro-physical phenomena are not quantum phenomena and quantum physics cannot describe or explain them. Only by means of classical physics including its theory of relativity, can we adequately grasp and understand the macro-physical reality. 
^6	 	 For other, quite different, possibilist approaches to quantum reality consult Lombardi and Dieks 2017, Lombardi and Castagnino 2008, Lombardi et al. 2011, and Suárez 2004. For an actualist approach, in contrast, consult Dieks 2010 and Bueno 2014. Referring to an actualist approach that is also an empiricist one, Bueno comments: “To recognize real modality in nature is to recognize the existence of non-actual, merely possible phenomena, and also to recognize necessary connections in reality. These are, of course, anathema to empiricism ever since Hume” (2014, p. 3). Dieks refers to the possibilists who think that “quantum mechanics makes possibilities as ontologically serious as actualities” (Dieks 2010, p. 119), whom he strongly opposes. This kind of quantum possibilism, which is realist about possible worlds (cf. Bueno 2014, p. 6, 8, and 12), is sharply different from the metaphysical platform on which I rest the following discussion. Of great interest is Diederik Aerts’s approach, introducing “a well-defined proposal for the nature of a quantum particle, namely that it is not an object but a concept” (Aerts 2010, p. 16). With Aerts’s view, as abstract, non-local concepts, existing outside of space-time, pulled into space-time through measurements (op. cit., p. 28), quantum particles are mind-dependent, individual pure possibilities. This view is certainly not compatible with mine. According to Aerts’s approach, localization or collapse “means here rendering concrete or becoming more concrete” (ibid.). In contrast, individual quantum pure possibilities, as I see them, are particular and by no means abstract. As Jeffrey Bub claims, “the idea behind a ‘modal’ interpretation of quantum mechanics is that quantum states, unlike classical states, constrain possibilities rather than actualities” (Bub 1997, p. 173; cf.: “the change in the quantum state |ψ > manifests itself directly at a modal level—the level of possibility rather than actuality”). Cf. Tomasz Bigaj’s critique concerning “the being of a disposition involves something that is merely possible, not actual” (Bigaj 2012, p. 216). 
^7	 	 To date, I have devoted four books to introduce and elaborate on this metaphysics (Gilead 1999, 2003, 2009, and 2011). For various applications of panenmentalism, most of which deal with natural sciences, consider Gilead 2004; 2005; 2008; 2010; 2013; 2014a; 2014b; 2015b; 2015b; 2016; and 2017.
^8	 	 In the current paper, I use the notion “possible world” only in the ontological sense, not in the semantic one. Likewise, in his famous paper, “Six Possible Worlds of Quantum Mechanics”, John Bell relates the many worlds interpretation to the notion of possible worlds (Bell 1987, pp. 192–193). This paper by Bell and some other papers about worlds or universes in quantum mechanics are included in an anthology devoted to the issue of possible worlds (Sture 1989).
^9	 	 Nevertheless, with no collapse. As Dieks puts it: “In accordance with what was just said about the implausibility of collapses, most modern treatments of quantum mechanics do without them. In these no-collapse interpretations (e.g., decoherence approaches, many worlds interpretations, modal interpretations) states that are superpositions of different possibilities are endemic. But as we have justobserved, even if one does accept the occurrence of collapses one must acknowledge that quantum states generally contain the actual and possible alike. This is therefore a typical feature of quantum mechanics” (Dieks 2010, p. 121). Note that Dieks opposes the possibilist interpretations of quantum mechanics and endorses rather an actualist, Humean one (op. cit., p. 130: “according to the Humean view on laws, only actual things and events exist”). 
^10	 	 For the debate about the validity of Leibniz’s principle for quantum physics, consult Paul Teller 1983. Teller surveys and analyzes the attempts to subject quantum reality to Leibniz’s principle concerning the identity of indiscernibles. His aim is “to further whet the appetite for work on what I think are some of the most fascinating interpretive problems we face today” (op. cit., p. 319). Teller’s example of the merger of two waves on the rope into one wave (op. cit., p. 309) does not refute Leibniz’s principle, rather the contrary: it justifies it. The product of the merger is a homogeneous whole whose “parts” are indistinguishable (in fact, it does not consist of parts). Hence, it is a single, one wave and not two combined identical or indiscernible waves. Furthermore, superposition is not a merger of waves (contrary to op. cit., p. 317), and unlike Teller’s merger, it comprises the individual pure possibilities (in terms of states or values) that are open to the entity in discussion, while each of these possibilities is a discernible individual. If actualization occurs, only one of these individual possibilities is determined or chosen.  
^11	 	 On counting photons or quanta, see, for instance, Fossum 2016. Nevertheless, as for counting photons, we should not ignore the following fact: “the clicking sound produced when a photon is caught by a detector says two things: yes, a particle was detected; but sorry, the way you detected it killed it, and its energy was converted into an electric pulse” (Orozco 2007, p. 872).
^12	 	 Cf.: “If we take Ψ as the ‘real’ entity which fully represents the actual state of affairs of the world, we encounter a number of difficulties. . . . it appears to be impossible to understand how specific observed values q, q′, q″, … can emerge from the same Ψ” (Laudisa and Rovelli 2013). Moreover, to cite Lombardi and Dieks, “quantum mechanics does not correspond in a one-to-one way to actual reality, but rather provides us with a list of possibilities and their probabilities.  . . .  In modal interpretations the event space on which the (preferred) probability measure is defined is a space of possible events, among which only one becomes actual . . .  . By contrast to actualism—the conception that reduces possibility to actuality . . . some modal interpretations, in particular the MHI [the modal-Hamiltonian interpretation], adopt a possibilist conception, according to which possible events—possibilia—constitute a basic ontological category  . . .  The probability measure is in this case seen as a representation of an ontological propensity of a possible quantum event to become actual” (Lombardi and Dieks 2017).  		   
^13	 	 Consult a recent fascinating idea put forward by Leonard Susskind (2016) and Juan Maldacena (2013). This novel idea suggests considering the two well-known papers by Einstein and his collaborators (Nathan Rosen and Boris Podolsky—ER and EPR respectively) as two complementary descriptions of physical reality. The first is the description that general relativity provides us with, and the second is the one with which quantum mechanics endows us. Susskind and Maldacena suggest treating the two papers as ER = EPR, which does not claim that the two irreducible descriptions are one and the same but that they are united or unified into a complete, coherent, and intelligible picture of physical reality. This holds true also for panenmentalism, for the description of reality as consisting of individual pure possibilities and their universal relationality is irreducible to describing it as a system of actualities and vice versa. These two descriptions are united but by no means identical. Such an approach leaves reality as rich as possible and does not commit it to the poverty that reductionism inevitably implies.
^14	 	 I am indebted to [Meir Hemmo for various helpful comments on an early version of this paper. Although Meir and myself disagree over some essential points concerning quantum metaphysics, the dialogue between us about it has proven to be quite interesting and illuminating.]
